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We aim for robust, don’t we?
Robust Defined
• Strong, relentless commitment from senior management
• Technically competent, motivated safety professionals
• Successful implementation of process fundamentals:
– System for hazard identification, analysis and control
– “grassroots” involvement
– Employee training
– Accident investigation / lessons learned
• System to coordinate work across departments, work teams
• Mechanisms facilitating worker feedback to management
• A desire to achieve “world class”
Dissecting The Robust Safety Process
Commitment
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Process
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Implementation
Coordination
Feedback
World Class
This Isn’t It!
Tom Peters…
Excellent companies focus 
consciously and consistently on 
rigorous practices!
Employee Expectations Are 
High…We’re the Experts!
Does Anyone Sell Themselves As 
Less Than the Expert?
Beware Of Single-point Failure Traps
Examples:
• A procedure that requires an 
experimenter to survey a shipping 
package upon receipt and notify the 
safety professional only when radioactive 
levels exceed a pre-determined threshold 
rely solely on the experimenter to act as 
expected
- how would you improve this procedure?
• Other examples of single-point failure traps?
Our Process At Livermore Is Robust
Indicators
• Management does “believe”
• We are strong in technical depth
• We have the vision to be the best in class
• We are process driven…and it is repeatable
• Work beyond “commonly performed by the public”
requires an authorization document
• We measure performance…and strive for continuous 
improvement
The process can still fail the worker!
… case study
“Exposure to Exhaust Gases, 
Including Carbon Monoxide, 
During Manlift Operations”
The Job
• Replace smoke detectors in B-334 East & 
West Bays
– Biennial calibration required by code never
performed due to difficult access
• Smoke tests only on biennial schedule
– Replacement detectors self-checking, biennial 
calibration not required
– Detectors mounted to 33’ high ceiling
• Located above HVAC ducting
• Fixed equipment and a pit in East Bay make 
vertical assent difficult
Organization scheduled this work as part of a 100% completion 
goal subsequent to a finding that it had not previously completed 
all required alarm checks and maintenance.
Plant Engineering 
ES&H Assessment Document
The purpose of this form is to communicate, review and understand all facility safety issues and Plant   
Engineering safety issues that need to be defined, mitigated and authorized prior to start of work.
Work Request # _____________________          JO       PM   Facility _________     Room _______   
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Please answer the following five ISM questions related to the facility in which the work 
requested will be performed in.
1) Are there any Operational Impacts/Scheduling required? Yes        No 
2) Are there unique Facility hazards associated with this request? Yes        No 
3) Is there a Facility IWS/Procedure(s) that applies to this request?                      Yes        No
IWS #                                             Work Permit #
4)   Will this request have any significant Programmatic Impact? Yes        No
5)   Does the FPOC need to be contacted Yes        No 
A “Bridging” Document Was Completed 
by the Facility and the Task Lead
Bridging Document, con’t
All work activity that is performed by Plant Engineering craft services are documented in our 
Trade/Service IWSs.  These worksheets may be accessed through the Plant Engineering web 
pages.   http://www-r.llnl.gov/plant_eng/safety/ism/iws.html
The Trade/Service IWS that covers this work activity is IWS# 
To perform this work activity, the following permits, procedures and/or safety plans are required;  
Permits
Asbestos Work              Concrete Penetration/Jackhammering Confined Space      
Critical Lift Drain Work Excavation Permit
Fire/Burning                   Lead Abatement Low Voltage Outage        
Roof Access                  Facility Work Permit
Procedures Safety Plans
Ceiling and Wall Penetration                               Use of Bridge Crane as mobile platform 
Scaffolding Installation                                   Working on or near energized equipment      
Inspection of Cryogenic Storage Systems 
Lock Out & Tag
Training
All  personnel working this request are appropriately trained for this work activity and the use   
of  necessary  tools/equipment
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Facility Hazards/Impacts have been identified, controls are in place.                                    
Work has been authorized to proceed. 
FPOC Name: Ext: Beeper:
FPOC Concurrence: Date: 
Employee# and Signature
Plant Engineering’s Individual Responsible for Job Execution
PE Individual's Name: Ext: Beeper : 
PE Concurrence:                                                 Date:
Employee# and Signature
The only hazard noted on the Bridging Document 
was the need for the bridge crane to be locked out 
of service before work could begin.
…the Task Lead and FPOC signed the document
Accessing the Detectors
• FPOC and Task Lead 
agree a manlift is the 
most feasible way to 
reach the detectors
• Although several sizes 
are on site, the JLG 60 
was the only one 
available at the time
Sequence of Work
• JLG 60 would not physically fit into the 
West Bay
– Canceled work in West Bay 
– Proceeded with work in East Bay
• Three person crew assigned to task
– Task Lead and 2 Techncians 
• Technician prepares to move lift into building
First Sign of Trouble
• Technician observed by FPOC reviewing 
operator manual for lift
– Technician “qualified” to operate the lift
– No operating experience sine completing 
hands on certification 4.5 years earlier
– Operator intended to practice in the yard 
outside the building
• FPOC asks Technician if she is qualified to operate the lift
– Technician answers “YES”
– Requests permission to practice in the yard
• FPOC relays request for practice to Security
– Yard Sergeant denies request
The operator was not able to maneuver the lift into the 
building - another operator in the area provided help
A conscious decision was made to 
keep the double doors closed
• Yard Sergeant asks FPOC if he 
wanted the doors left open
• FPOC replies “no”
• believed two armed guards required if doors are open
• told Yard sergeant the ventilation system was “adequate”
• informed the Task Lead the doors would be closed for 
security reasons
• suggests engine be turned off at each detector head
Open doors did not require guards when SNM not present
Once the manlift was inside the 
building, operator 1 took control
• Operator dons PPE
• FPOC leaves area to attend a 
meeting
• Operator experiences difficulty 
with equipment controls
• Operator requests help from 
second operator in the area
• Second operator returns and 
reviews controls 
The crew was ready to begin work
No one paid attention to the 
warning label below
Work begins as operator begins to 
maneuver the manlift
The Sequence
• ~ 30 minutes to complete 
Northwest detector
• Engine ran on propane 
continuously ~ 30 minutes due 
to frequent relocation of basket
• Operator begins to move to 
Southwest detector head
Location of detectors 
made access difficult
Operator begins to experience 
difficulty while maneuvering manlift
• Physiological symptoms of fatigue, 
irritability, thirst and butterflies
• Made request to Task Lead (ground 
support) for a drink of water
• Operator begins to lower the
manlift basket as the Task Lead 
goes to get water
• While in route, Task Lead is paged 
by supervisor and agrees to meet 
him outside building, delayed 
return by ~ 5 minutes
Task Leads returns to room and 
finds operator in trouble
• Operator is sitting on floor 
of basket
• Basket is ~ 10 feet above 
floor over a pit
• Task Lead uses ladder to 
get drink to operator
• Recognizes operator is in 
trouble
Task Lead helps operator out of basket, down 
the ladder and into fresh air
Post Incident
• Vehicle was found to operating 
“rich” resulting in a higher level of 
CO being exhausted
• Fired Department recorded 854 
ppm in the East Bay ~ 30 minutes 
after engine shut off
– TWA = 50 ppm
The work crew did not monitor for CO 
while performing their work.
Did the system fail the worker?
YES!
• Training program did not ensure operator 
capability
• Bridging document was not adequate to 
identify all hazards & controls 
• FPOC did not understand security rules    
• FPOC did not understand the building 
ventilation system
• The 100% goal pressured the supervisor
• Assistance from the ES&H Team was not 
triggered when initial scope changed - use of 
manlift (no formal risk assessment requested)
Did the system fail the worker?
YES!
• Less than adequate guidance in ES&H Manual 
in that the operation of manlifts indoors was not 
addressed     
• General misconception that propane powered 
equipment is safe for use indoors
Elimination of any of these factors may 
have prevented this incident!
Making rigorous…more rigorous
• Site-wide policy for the use of internal 
combustion engines indoors
– Include hazard assessment by ES&H Team
– Portable CO monitors
• More rigorous requirements for operators 
to demonstrate their capability
• Posting of warning labels on internal 
combustion equipment to warn personnel 
about it’s use indoors or in confined 
spaces
– Fleet maintenance to check legibility of 
labels/stickers during PMs
• Site-wide emission standards for JLGs, 
Forklifts, Scissor Lifts and other internal 
combustion equipment
Workers have high expectations!
